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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
 
The European Commission adopted a revised legislative package for EU Smart Borders on 6 
April 2016. The original Smart Borders package (which originated from two earlier 
Commission communications, dated February 2008 and October 2011) had been adopted in 
February 2013. This 2013 package was met with considerable reservations from the 
European Parliament and the Council, as well as the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) and civil society organisations. EU Smart Borders initially included two key 
measures: the establishment of an Entry/Exit System (EES) and a Registered Traveller 
Programme (RTP) for third-country nationals crossing the EU’s external borders. The 2016 
revised package withdraws the legislative proposal for establishing an RTP, leaving the EES 
as the key feature of EU Smart Borders. EES consists of two proposed regulations: one to 
establish the Entry/Exit system and another to amend the Schengen Borders Code with 
regards to the use of the Entry/Exit system. Another key difference is law enforcement 
access, which the 2016 revised package foresees from the onset.  
 
Aim  
This study appraises the European Commission’s revised legislative proposals for EU Smart 
Borders. It builds on a 2013 study “The Commission’s legislative proposals on Smart 
Borders: their feasibility and costs” for the European Parliament that assessed the technical 
feasibility and cost of EU Smart Borders. The present study reviews critically the revised 
legislative proposals against the findings of this earlier study and concerns expressed by 
the European Parliament in prior reports about this initiative. The study also presents a 
thorough fundamental rights check. 
 
Findings  
With regard to the review of the revised Smart Borders package in light of earlier 
controversies, the study finds the following: 
 
 The discussion on Smart Borders over the last eight years has been characterised by 
a regular and repeated reshuffling of objectives. The fact that the same measures 
are systematically put forward in different contexts suggests that the Smart 
Borders measures may well not meet the general criteria of proportionality 
applicable to EU action. 
 The objective of better implementing EU border management policy by facilitating 
border-crossing procedures for third-country nationals entering or exiting the EU for 
the purpose of short stays has been significantly narrowed. With the withdrawal 
of RTP, the Smart Borders package no longer creates a legal requirement for 
the Member States to introduce facilitation measures (ABC gates and self-
service kiosks in particular). 
 The assessment work in support of the revised package is more thoroughly 
documented than was the case for its predecessor. Yet these assessment efforts 
mostly went into demonstrating the validity of the European Commission’s 
preferred option rather than providing an exhaustive overview of all possible 
policy options. 
 The new cost of Smart Borders to the EU budget is EUR 480 million for four 
years (three years of development and deployment and one year of 
operation). This amount is lower than the EUR 623 million for five years of 
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development and deployment of EES in the 2013 package. In the meantime, the 
accumulated cost to the EU and Member State budgets is EUR 1.013 billion 
for the period 2017-2026. Furthermore, the contractor and the European 
Commission report a 15-20% margin of error in costing. 
 The technical feasibility of the measures envisaged in the legislative package has 
been tested in real-life conditions, but the contractor, eu-LISA and the European 
Commission have not delivered an implementation plan for EES. Furthermore, 
not all of the findings of the testing phase can be generalised, in particular 
with regard to automated/facilitation processes. 
 Overall, the measures foreseen in the Smart Borders package are, given its 
objectives, disproportionate. There is a clear lack of evidence to confirm that 
EES would contribute to curbing overstaying and no evidence that law 
enforcement access to EES is relevant. The contribution of the envisaged 
measures to better implementing EU border management policy (by reducing 
the workload of border guards and facilitating border crossings) is unclear and 
ambiguous. 
With regard to the fundamental rights check of the revised Smart Borders package, 
the study finds the following: 
 The large-scale collection and storage of personal data, including biometric data, 
form an interference with the right to private life under the ECHR, and 
hence also under the CFR. 
 Given the special nature of biometric data, the indiscriminate and massive 
collection of it makes the infringement particularly serious.  
 The proposal fails the proportionality and necessity test for the objectives of 
migration and border management as well as criminal law enforcement.  
 
Recommendations  
Regarding the impact assessment submitted by the European Commission: 
 
 In light of the significant accumulated cost for the development, deployment and 
first seven years of operation of EES and the significant margin of error of 15-20% 
indicated in the costing of the proposed measures, the LIBE Committee should 
require the European Commission to further clarify the financial burden and 
budget risk to the EU and Member States. 
 The impact assessment of the revised legislative package does not provide a 
basis in evidence for the proportionality – in the sense of Article 5(4) of the 
TEU – of a measure that specifically aims to curb overstays of third-country 
nationals crossing the EU’s external borders for short stays. In this regard, 
the LIBE Committee should require the European Commission to design a 
complementary impact study providing unambiguous evidence that the 
Smart Borders package does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objective of curbing overstaying. 
 The impact assessment of the revised legislative package does not provide an 
evidence-based demonstration that law enforcement access to EES is 
proportionate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the TEU. The LIBE Committee 
should require the European Commission, together with eu-LISA, to provide up-to-
date and detailed information regarding searches for law-enforcement 
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purposes involving fingerprints in the VIS. The study finds that at this time the 
reporting of eu-LISA on the use of VIS for law enforcement purposes, which is used 
as the basis for assessing the projected use of EES, remains inconclusive, in 
particular for searches involving fingerprints. New evidence should be properly taken 
into account when considering law enforcement access to EES. 
 The additional clarifications and further evidence should be examined in a 
study undertaken by independent experts before the Smart Borders package is 
taken into consideration by the co-legislators. 
Regarding the use of biometrics (facial images and fingerprints) in the proposed 
measures: 
 
 Although the revised legislative package constitutes an effort to minimise the 
biometric data collected and stored in the proposed EES, proportionality issues 
remain. The LIBE Committee should consider the following options to achieve 
further data minimisation.    
 The objective of replacing the physical stamping obligation can be achieved 
without collecting, storing or accessing fingerprints. It is sufficient to 
compare a live facial image with the facial image stored on the chip of an 
electronic passport to verify the identity of travellers. This process does not 
require storage of facial image biometrics, thus increasing data minimisation. Visual 
verification by a border guard is sufficient in cases where travellers do not 
carry an e-passport. For the purpose of replacing the physical stamping obligation, 
the storing of data on the identity of travellers, travel document and visa 
information, as well as travel history for a period of 181 days is sufficient. 
 Should the use of fingerprints, be considered relevant by the co-legislators, their 
introduction should be planned from the start to avoid issues encountered in the 
development of other JHA information systems. The LIBE Committee should 
however consider a tiered rollout process. To fully test the reliability of the 
system before particularly sensitive data is collected and stored, the introduction of 
fingerprints collection and storage in particular should be made conditional upon 
an assessment of the functionality of EES without fingerprints after at least 
two years of operation. This tiered rollout and assessment should also concern 
interoperability with VIS. The proposal for a regulation establishing the EES should 
accordingly be amended to include: 1) a two-year moratorium on the 
introduction of the collection and storage of, and access to fingerprints; 2) a 
suspension clause should the functioning of EES without the collecting and 
storing of as well as access to fingerprints be found less than optimal; 3) a 
sunset clause foreseeing the shutdown of EES functionalities for 
fingerprints collection and storage should data protection issues arise.  
Regarding the possibility of introducing further automated processes at EU external 
border crossings: 
 The adoption of a harmonised legal basis for the use of automated 
processes for border crossings is proportionate given the growing use by 
border control authorities of Member States of such processes, particularly ABC 
gates and e-kiosks. A harmonised legal basis would provide legal certainty and 
support facilitation measures to address the growing workload of border 
guards at the EU’s external borders. 
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 As such, the proposal for a regulation to amend the Schengen Borders Code for this 
purpose should be considered independently from the proposal for a regulation to 
establish EES. The LIBE Committee should consider the possibility of 
amending the proposal for a regulation to amend the Schengen Borders 
Code so that the provision of a harmonised legal basis for automation does 
not depend on the establishment of EES. 
Regarding law enforcement access to EES: 
 At this time there is no basis in evidence for providing law enforcement 
access to EES, whether by Member State authorities or Europol. Such a 
measure would not meet the criteria for either necessity or proportionality, either in 
the sense of Article 5(4) of the TEU or interference with fundamental rights. 
Therefore, the LIBE Committee should consider not endorsing law 
enforcement access to EES. 
 Before law enforcement access is considered, a thorough inquiry into the effective 
use of existing systems, especially VIS, should be conducted. At this time, the 
reporting of eu-LISA on the use of VIS for law enforcement purposes remains 
inconclusive. Since VIS has only recently completed its full rollout, a five-year 
monitoring and assessment period by eu-LISA to start in 2016 or 2017 
should be considered a minimum to inform a decision on law enforcement 
access to EES. This would give time for law enforcement authorities in the Member 
States to familiarise themselves with VIS and provide information about its utility. 
 Should law enforcement access to EES eventually be found relevant by the co-
legislators, provisions similar to the collection and storage of biometrics should 
apply, namely: 1) a two-year moratorium on law enforcement access to EES in 
order to ensure that the system is functioning as planned; 2) a suspension clause 
should the functioning of EES without law enforcement access be found less than 
optimal; 3) a sunset clause foreseeing the shutdown of law enforcement 
access to EES should it be found irrelevant (low number of searches) 
and/or should issues with the purpose of access or use of access arise. 
Regarding the fundamental compliance of the Smart Borders proposal with fundamental 
rights: 
 As it stands, the EES proposal forms a particularly serious interference with the 
right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data. 
This interference should be considered disproportionate. 
 The indiscriminate retention period of five years cannot be justified either in view of 
the objective of identifying overstay or for the purpose of criminal law enforcement. 
The originally envisaged retention period of 181 days should be considered 
again. In addition, the possibility of distinct retention periods for distinct 
categories of persons should be contemplated.  
 The proposal should provide an effective judicial remedy for all data subjects in 
line with Article 47 CFR. This remedy should not merely cover access, correction and 
deletion; it also should not be made dependent on the provision of additional 
personal data.  
 The transfer of data from the EES to third countries in the context of return should 
only be possible under the strict conditions prescribed in the proposal and 
exclusively when there is an adequacy decision in the third country 
concerned as regards the protection of personal data.  
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 The rationale for the collection and access to EES by criminal law enforcement are 
not supported by objective and sound evidence. It is the task of the EU 
legislator to provide such evidence. 
 The proposal should guarantee the independence of ex-ante control of access 
to law enforcement. 
 The provisions regulating access to the EES by law enforcement need to be drafted 
with much more precision so as to provide for both legal certainty and diverging 
approaches across the Member States. In particular: 1) in Articles 29(b) and 30(b), 
the meaning of ‘specific case’ should be clarified; 2) in Articles 29(b) and 29(c), 
the definition of ‘reasonable grounds’ should be further specified, as well as the 
exact meaning of ‘substantially contribute’; 3) in Article 29, the meaning of 
‘reasonable grounds’ on which access to EES can be authorised without 
prior searches in national databases and in the Prüm system should be 
clarified; 4) in Article 29, the notion of criminal intelligence should either be 
defined or removed, as it is not defined elsewhere in the EES regulation or in EU 
legislation and therefore constitutes too broad a criteria for authorising law 
enforcement access. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General information and rationale of the study 
 
This study appraises the European Commission’s revised legislative proposals for EU Smart 
Borders. It builds on a 2013 study for the European Parliament that assessed the technical 
feasibility and cost of EU Smart Borders.1 The present study reviews critically the revised 
legislative proposals against the findings of this earlier study and concerns expressed by 
the European Parliament in prior reports about this initiative. The study also presents a 
thorough fundamental rights check. 
 
The original Smart Borders package (which originated from two earlier Commission 
communications, dated February 2008 and October 2011) was adopted by the European 
Commission in February 2013.2 EU Smart Borders initially included two key measures: the 
establishment of an EES and a RTP for third-country nationals crossing the EU’s external 
borders. The 2016 revised package withdraws the legislative proposal for establishing an 
RTP, leaving the EES as the key feature of EU Smart Borders. EES consists of two proposed 
regulations: one to establish the Entry/Exit system (hereafter EES regulation) and 
another to amend the Schengen Borders Code with regards to the use of the Entry/Exit 
system (hereafter SBC/EES regulation).3  
 
The 2013 legislative package was poorly received. The European Parliament and the 
Council expressed strong reservations over its cost, technical feasibility, and scope.4 The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the Article 29 Working Party (WP29), and 
civil society groups such as the Meijers Committee voiced major concerns regarding 
necessity and proportionality, particularly in light of the volume of personal data processing 
the measures would entail. The European Commission's own Impact Assessment Board 
twice asked DG Home to provide evidence supporting the need for EU action in relation to 
the objectives set by the Smart Borders package.5   
 
The 2016 revised legislative package, on the other hand, is based on what the Commission 
has termed a ‘proof-of-concept exercise’.6 This exercise, organised in 2014-2015, 
comprised a technical study led by the European Commission and contracted out to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which was published, together with a report on cost 
analysis, in October 2014.7 The PwC technical study outlined a series of options for 
implementing the Smart Borders measures, in particular the Entry-Exit System. The 
                                                 
1 J. Jeandesboz, D. Bigo, B. Hayes, and S. Simon (2013), The Commission's Legislative Proposals on Smart 
Borders: Their feasibility and costs, Brussels: European Parliament, PE 462.613. 
2 European Commission (2008), Preparing the Next Steps in Border Management in the European Union, 
COM(2008) 69 final; European Commission (2011), Smart Borders – Options and the way ahead, COM(2011) 680 
final. 
3 On EES regulation, see European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of 
third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining 
the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 
and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, COM(2016) 194 final. On SBC/EES regulation, see European Commission 
(2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System, COM(2016) 196 final. 
4 European Parliament IMPA (2013), Initial apparaisal of a European Commission impact assessment: Smart 
Borders Package, PE 514.062. 
5 European Commission Impact Assessment Board (2013), Opinion – DG Home – Impact assessment on a 
proposal establishing the entry/exit system, Brussels, 2010/HOME/004; European Commission Impact Assessment 
Board (2013), Opinion – DG Home – Impact assessment on a proposal establishing the entry/exit system, 
Brussels, 2010/HOME/006. 
6 European Commission (2016), Impact Assessment Report on the establishment of an EU Entry Exit System (Part 
1/3), Brussels, SWD(2016) 115 final, Part I, p. 1. 
7 PwC (2014), Technical Study on Smart Borders – Final report, Brussels: European Commission, October 2014 
(hereafter referred to as Final Report); PwC (2014), Technical Study on Smart Borders – Cost Analysis, Brussels: 
European Commission, October 2014 (hereafter referred to as Cost Analysis). 
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options were then tested through a pilot project steered by eu-LISA, which was completed 
in November 2015. In the meantime, the European Commission held a series of technical 
and political meetings with the co-legislators and experts from the Member States; with 
different groups of stakeholders, including representatives from civil society, carriers and 
Member State law enforcement agencies; and with fundamental rights bodies, including the 
EDPS and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The LIBE Committee hosted an inter-
parliamentary hearing on Smart Borders on 23 February 2015. The European Commission 
further opened up a public consultation on the Smart Borders package, which was 
published in December 2015. Along with the revised legislative package, lastly, the 
European Commission published a new, three-tiered impact assessment report in 2016.8 
On the basis of the ‘proof-of-concept exercise’ and of stakeholder mobilisation, the impact 
assessment report of the European Commission states that ‘the question whether an Entry-
Exit System is necessary and desirable is no longer in the centre of political debate. The 
real issue, which … forms the main part of the Impact Assessment, is how such a system 
should be developed’.9  
 
1.2. General argument 
 
The underlying assumption of the revised Smart Borders package - that the discussion on 
the revised package should focus exclusively on implementation - confirms one of the key 
observations of the 2013 study requested by the LIBE Committee. This study examined the 
purpose of impact assessment, finding that it presents the co-legislator with ‘a set of 
scenarios designed to legitimise the policy option already chosen by the European 
Commission’ rather than serving as an aid to decision-making.10  
 
That the revised set of scenarios outlined in the 2016 Smart Borders proposals is now more 
strongly supported with evidence and significant stakeholder mobilisation is not in question. 
This observation, however, cannot pre-empt a thorough examination of how these 
scenarios are now justified (the purpose, objectives, and motivations of having EU Smart 
Borders) and how these scenarios were designed (the questions that were asked and 
answered through the ‘proof-of-concept exercise’). A particular scenario or policy option, in 
other words, can be deemed feasible and financially sound, with evidence mustered to this 
effect, but such an assessment should not circumscribe discussions of the said scenario or 
policy option to a question of 'how'.  
A key question here is proportionality, a constitutional principle (as per Article 5(4) 
of the TEU) guiding the exercise of legislative competence. At the same time, any 
measure that interferes with a fundamental right will need to be proportionate, 
which leaves the EU legislator with limited discretion only. The European Commission 
has organised discussions and consultations on fundamental rights issues. In the meantime, 
the EES foresees the systematic recording of the entries and exits of all foreigners 
crossing the EU’s external borders for short stays by collecting and storing data, 
including biometrics, for a five-year period. This measure needs to be assessed against 
the backdrop of the European Court of Justice's rulings on other instances of systematic data 
collection and mass surveillance, and in particular its judgment on the Data Retention 
Directive on 8 April 2014. 
 
1.3. Methodology and organisation of the study 
Given the time requirements, the study is mostly based on desk research but also draws on 
previous research materials available to the contributors. 
 
                                                 
8 SWD(2016) 115 final, Parts 1 to 3. 
9 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part I, p. 2, emphasis original. 
10 Jeandesboz et al., Commission's legislative proposals, op. cit, p. 11. 
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The study is organised as follows. The next section (2) reviews the 2016 Smart Borders 
package by providing a general assessment of the revised legislative proposals, focusing on 
costs, technical feasibility and overall proportionality of the initiative. The following section 
(3) provides a fundamental rights check of the proposals.  
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2. REVIEW OF THE REVISED SMART BORDERS PACKAGE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The discussion on Smart Borders in the last eight years has been characterised by a 
regular and repeated reshuffling of objectives. The fact that the same measures 
should be systematically put forward in different contexts suggests that the 
smart borders measures may well not meet the general criteria of 
proportionality applicable to EU action. 
 The objective of better implementing EU border management policy by facilitating 
border crossing procedures for third-country nationals entering or exiting the EU for 
the purpose of short stays has been significantly narrowed. With the withdrawal 
of RTP, the Smart Borders package no longer creates a legal requirement for 
Member States to introduce facilitation measures (ABC gates and self-service 
kiosks in particular). 
 The assessment work supporting the revised package is more thoroughly 
documented than was the case for its predecessor. Yet these assessment efforts 
mostly went into demonstrating the validity of the European Commission’s 
preferred option rather than providing an exhaustive overview of all possible 
policy options. 
 The new cost of Smart Borders to the EU budget is EUR 480 million for four 
years (three years of development and deployment and one year of 
operation). This amount is lower than the EUR 623 million for five years of 
development and deployment of EES in the 2013 package. In the meantime, the 
accumulated cost to the EU and Member State budgets is EUR 1.013 billion 
for the period 2017-2026. Furthermore, the contractor and the European 
Commission report a 15-20% margin of error in costing. 
 The technical feasibility of the measures envisaged in the legislative package has 
been tested in real-life conditions, but the contractor, eu-LISA, and the European 
Commission have not delivered an implementation plan for EES. Furthermore, 
not all of the findings of the testing phase can be generalised, in particular 
with regard to automated/facilitation processes. 
 Overall, the measures foreseen in the Smart Borders package are, given its 
objectives, disproportionate. There is a clear lack of evidence to confirm that 
EES would contribute to curbing overstaying and no evidence that law 
enforcement access to EES is relevant. The contribution of the envisaged 
measures to better implementing EU border management policy (by reducing 
the workload of border guards and facilitating border crossings) is unclear and 
ambiguous. 
 
 
2.1. The outlook of the revised package 
2.1.1. Scope and substance: smart borders as EES 
The 2013 Smart Borders proposals comprised two key measures, the establishment of EES 
and RTP. The revised proposals of 2016 only consider the establishment of EES. The 
‘spirit’ of RTP, nonetheless, persists with a narrower scope in the SBC/EES regulation 
proposal, which foresees the insertion of a new Article 8e allowing for the establishment of 
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optional ‘national facilitation programmes’ by Member State authorities (see below, section 
2.1.3). 
 
As with the earlier legislative package, the EES concerns third-country nationals who cross 
the EU’s external borders for short stays (up to 90 days in a period of 180 days), whether 
they are subject to or exempt from the visa obligation. The revised EES would be a 
centralised system, interoperable at a central level with the Visa Information System (VIS) 
and with a National Uniform Interface (NUI) for communication with Member State 
authorities. The system would register entry and exit records for both visa-waiving and 
visa-holding third-country nationals. The system would process biometric data in two ways: 
firstly, by recording biometric identifiers from visa-waiving third country nationals (four 
fingerprints in combination with a facial image); secondly, by pulling biometric identifiers 
for visa-holding third-country nationals from VIS. The data collected in the system are 
retained for a five-year period. Finally, the 2016 legislative proposal, unlike its previous 
iteration, gives access to the EES from the onset for law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States and Europol.  
 
The architecture of EES in the revised EES proposal comprises three components: a 
central unit, a NUI, and a connection with VIS. The central unit or system is a computerised 
database of biometric and alphanumeric data. EES’s interoperability with VIS, which is 
organised at a central level, enables the pulling of biometrics (fingerprints) of Schengen 
visa-holding travellers from the latter system. The NUI is a single-user interface used by all 
Member State authorities when performing tasks linked with EES purposes. 
 
When it comes to data subjects and data, the system would record border 
crossings by all third-country nationals visiting the Schengen area for a short stay 
(up to 90 days in a period of 180 days) regardless of their visa status (visa exempt, visa 
holders and holders of a touring visa for a duration of up to one year). Third-country 
nationals who enjoy the right of free movement or the rights of free movement 
equivalent to those of EU citizens (family members of EU citizens or permanent 
residents) but who do not yet have a residence card are also included.  
 
The data registered in the EES includes 26 elements, down from 36 in the 2013 proposal: 
 
 Identity of third-country national: first name, surname, date of birth, nationality, 
gender; 
 Biometrics: four fingerprints and a facial image for visa-waiving third-country 
nationals. The EES does not store the biometric data of visa-holding persons, which 
remain stored in VIS; 
 Information on travel document: document number, document type, document 
country code and expiry date; 
 Information on the visa for visa-holding third-country nationals: visa sticker 
number, visa expiry date, number of authorised entries, authorised period of stay; 
 Information on cross-border movements of the person: date and time of entry, 
authority allowing entry, entry border crossing point, date and time of exit, exit 
border crossing point; 
 Information on changes of authorisation of stay: revised expiry date of the 
authorisation of stay, date of change of limit of stay, place of change of limit of stay, 
ground for change or revocation.11 
The data retention period is five years, in contrast with the foreseen retention 
period of 181 days in the 2013 EES regulation. 
 
                                                 
11 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part I, p. 34. 
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Finally, the revised EES proposal provides access from the onset to Member State 
law enforcement services and Europol. The initial 2013 Smart Borders proposal 
foresaw an evaluation of EES after two years in order to adjudicate on law enforcement 
access. The current proposal foresees law enforcement and Europol access ‘as a secondary 
purpose from the start’ (Chapter IV in EES regulation) ‘in order to prevent, detect and 
investigate terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences’.12 Law enforcement access 
to EES is allowed for the purposes of identification and criminal intelligence. This access, 
furthermore, is only granted if specific conditions are met, as specified in Articles 29 and 30 
(concerning Europol) of the proposed EES regulation: 
 
 Access is allowed if necessary ‘in a specific case’. 
 Access is conditioned upon the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’, ‘in particular 
where there is a substantiated suspicion that the suspect, perpetrator or victim of a 
terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence falls under a category covered by 
this Regulation’. 
 Access is conditioned upon unsuccessful prior searches in national databases and, in 
cases of fingerprint searches, upon unsuccessful prior searches in the Prüm 
database. Such searches are not required ‘when there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a comparison with the systems of the other Member States would not 
lead to the verification of the identity of the data subject’.  
 It is possible to carry out parallel requests for access to data contained in EES and 
VIS because only VIS stores the fingerprint data of visa-holding persons. 
2.1.2. Objectives: Smart Borders as a solution in search of a problem? 
The revised scope and substance of the 2016 Smart Borders legislative proposals 
repackage the objectives of the envisaged measures. The explanatory memorandum 
introducing the EES regulation lists three objectives in the following order: 
 
 Improving the EU’s border management policy by addressing the issue of 
delays at passport/immigration control and improving the quality of border checks 
for non-EU travellers who fall within the scope of the proposed measures. The 
assumption is that this can be achieved by removing the stamping obligation and by 
using biometrics (fingerprints and facial images), which will permit the use of 
automated processes such as ABC gates and self-service kiosks; 
 Improving the EU’s visa and immigration policy by providing the means, 
mainly through biometrics (especially fingerprints), to monitor durations of stay and 
the identification of persons found to have exceed their authorised stay; 
 Reinforcing the internal security of the EU and the Member States by 
providing an additional identification tool (biometrics, especially fingerprints) for ‘the 
reliable identification of terrorists, criminals, as well as of suspects and victims’ and 
by providing the possibility to reconstruct travel histories.13 
These objectives have, however, fluctuated over time when one considers the various 
iterations of the Smart Borders initiative (here in reverse chronological order): 
 
 The explanatory memorandum introducing the 2013 EES regulation 
proposal justified the measure solely on immigration policy grounds 
                                                 
12 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part I, p. 38; COM(2016) 194 final, Art. 26(1). ‘Terrorist offences’ are the offences under 
national law which correspond to or are equivalent to those referred to in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA. ‘Serious criminal offences’ correspond to or are equivalent to those referred to in Article 2(2) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA if they are punishable under national law by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three years (see Article 3(26) and 3(27) of COM(2016) 194 
final). 
13 COM(2016) 194 final, pp. 2-3. 
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(monitoring durations of stay and taking steps against overstayers). While 
improving the management of EU external borders was listed as one of the expected 
impacts of the joint establishment of EES and RTP, the objective of reinforcing 
the internal security of the EU and Member States did not feature.14  
 In the 2011 Commission communication on policy options for Smart Borders, 
the primary objective was improving EU border management, in particular the 
handling of increasing numbers of border crossings. This was to be accomplished by 
providing support to the EU’s visa policy through monitoring durations of stay 
and, as a secondary objective, offering additional means to take steps against 
overstayers.15 
 The earliest 2008 iteration of the Smart Borders discussion by the European 
Commission had two objectives: enhancing security by intensifying the 
monitoring of non-EU citizens crossing the EU’s external borders and 
facilitating the border/passport check process for what the communication 
labelled ‘bona fide travellers’.16 
The discussion on Smart Borders in the last eight years has been characterised by a 
regular and repeated shuffling of objectives. While proposed legislation should 
logically address ongoing policy concerns, the fact that the same measures, albeit with 
some modifications, continue to be systematically put forward in different contexts 
suggests that the measures do not meet the general criteria of proportionality 
applicable to EU action. 
2.1.3. Withdrawal of RTP: what is left of facilitation? 
 
Facilitation has been pictured as a central issue in the various iterations of the 
Smart Border package. The 2008 Commission communication, ‘Next steps in border 
management in the European Union’, presented Smart Borders as a way to make 
‘[c]rossing the external border … simple and quick for third-country nationals fulfilling the 
entry conditions set by Community and national law’.17 Ensuring ‘that border crossings are 
fast and simple for the growing number of regular travellers that constitute the vast 
majority of border crossers, i.e., those fulfilling all entry conditions’ is foregrounded as a 
key challenge in the 2011 Commission communication on Smart Borders.18 The 2016 EES 
proposal follows suit by identifying border check delays, along with the quality of these 
checks, as the first challenge to address in the establishment of Smart Borders. In the 
meantime, the European Commission has withdrawn RTP from the 2016 legislative 
package, which suggests that the contribution of Smart Borders to facilitation has 
been reduced. 
 
First, facilitation in the context of Smart Borders means something different than 
facilitation in the broader context of EU immigration and visa policies.19 As outlined 
in the Global Approach to Migration Management (GAMM), facilitation involves offering 
broader – and possibly fairer – possibilities of access (including with regard to the issuance 
of Schengen visas) to the territory of the Member States for the purposes of work, study, 
or travel.20 While this definition of facilitation has been criticised for being overly 
instrumental and driven by security rather than labour considerations (among other 
concerns), it nonetheless retains a broad scope. Facilitation is a much narrower 
                                                 
14 COM(2016) 194 final, pp. 2-3. 
15 COM(2011) 680 final, p. 2-3. 
16 COM(2008) 69 final, p. 4-5. 
17 COM(2008) 69 final, p. 2. 
18 COM(2011) 680 final, p. 3. 
19 Another meaning of facilitation, which concerns irregular migration and people smuggling, falls outside of the 
present discussion but has recently been scrutinised in a study commissioned on behalf of the LIBE Committee; 
see S. Carrera et al. (2015), Fit for Purpose? The facilitation directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance to irregular migrants, Brussels: European Parliament, PE 536.490. 
20 European Commission (2011), The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 final. 
Smart Borders Revisited: An assessment of the Commission’s revised Smart Borders proposal 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 19 
objective in the Smart Borders package, referring to the notion that non-EU 
travellers should be able to clear passport and border control checks more 
quickly.  
 
Concerns with faster clearance of passport and immigration checks at the EU’s external 
borders tie in with the key justification foregrounded by the European Commission across 
the different communications and legislative packages on Smart Borders: namely, that the 
number of people crossing the EU’s external borders is bound to increase significantly in 
the upcoming decades. In the scenario presented by the European Commission, this 
expected increase in traveller numbers cannot be met by an increase in Member 
State personnel at external borders and thus requires a reliance on a variety of 
means, including automation and self-service facilities. 
 
The RTP was the core component for facilitation in the 2013 Smart Borders package. It 
envisaged the possibility of Schengen visa holders – provided that they submitted to a pre-
vetting procedure undertaken at a consulate of one of the Member States – benefitting 
from facilitated checks at the EU’s external borders. In the 2016 package, this measure has 
been replaced in the proposed SBC/EES regulation by Articles 8c, 8d and 8e: 
 
 Article 8c permits persons whose border crossing is subject to registration in the 
EES to use self-service systems to pre-enrol their individual file data in the 
EES, provided that they hold a travel document with an electronic chip and that this 
chip contains a facial image that can be accessed by the automated system. The 
article further establishes that the self-service system shall verify whether the 
traveller has a previous registration in EES and their identity by means of a 
comparison between a live facial image and the facial image extracted electronically 
from the machine-readable zone of the passport. If this verification indicates that 
the traveller’s data are not recorded in the EES, if the verification fails or if there are 
doubts as to the identity of the traveller, the self-service system shall carry out an 
identification using facial image and fingerprints (when and if available), including 
consultation of the VIS for both visa-holding and visa-exempt travellers. If the data 
on the person are not recorded in the EES following the identification run, or are 
found to require updating, the person is expected to pre-enrol with the self-service 
system and is then referred to a border guard. 
 Article 8d permits persons whose border crossing is subject to a registration in EES 
to use self-service systems (such as kiosks) and e-gates as de facto border 
checks. To do so, the person must hold a travel document with an electronic chip 
containing a facial image and must be enrolled or pre-enrolled in the EES. These 
self-service systems and e-gates are to be monitored by a border guard. 
 Article 8e would allow Member States to establish national facilitation programmes 
enabling third-country nationals to benefit from ‘facilitations’ when crossing the EU’s 
external borders. National facilitation programmes can apply to all third-country 
nationals (whether they are obliged to hold a Schengen visa or can waive the visa 
obligation) or to nationals of a specific third country. For persons enrolled in national 
facilitation programmes, Member State authorities are allowed to derogate some of 
the thorough checks third-country nationals are normally subjected to, provided that 
a pre-vetting procedure is carried out by visa or border services. This pre-vetting 
procedure is largely similar to the checks carried out when issuing a Schengen visa.  
In sum, and together with Articles 8a and 8b (which introduce the possibility for 
EU/EEA/CH citizens and third-country nationals holding a residence permit to use 
automated border control systems), the new Smart Borders package introduces a legal 
basis ‘foreseeing a harmonised automation of border checks for different 
categories of travellers’.21 In contrast to the 2013 legislative package, though, it does 
not introduce a requirement or create a legal obligation for Member State authorities 
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to implement such facilitation measures. This is not to say that such measures as e-gates 
and self-service kiosks are not already available for some categories of travellers at specific 
points of entry or that Member States are unlikely to introduce such measures in some 
cases. The fulfilment of the facilitation objective in the current iteration of the 
Smart Borders package is therefore based on the assumption that such measures 
are introduced by Member State authorities on a widespread and systematic basis 
but in the absence of an obligation to do so. 
 
2.2. Appraisal of the impact assessment for the revised package 
2.2.1. Controversies over the 2013 Smart Borders package 
To what extent does the 2016 Smart Borders package (and its accompanying 
documentation) address the controversies triggered by its 2013 precursor? In order to 
appraise the 2016 package, we briefly review these earlier controversies in order to 
establish a baseline scenario against which potential improvements can be assessed. We 
focus here on issues of feasibility and cost; matters related to human rights and data 
protection are examined in more detail in the second half of the study. The following points 
are based on the 2013 study on the original Smart Borders package requested by the LIBE 
Committee: 
 
 Costs. The 2013 package was characterised by rising costs, estimated by the 
European Commission at EUR 100 million in 2008 and at EUR 1.3 billion in 2011-
2013. The company contracted by the European Commission in 2010 to cost the 
Smart Borders package indicated a 25% confidence rate for their evaluation. 
 Technical feasibility. The 2013 study found that the original Smart Borders 
package did not include empirical verification of the preferred policy option. It also 
outlined that the European Commission and its contractors had not examined the 
preferred scenario for the development, deployment and operation of EU Smart 
Borders against experiences with likeminded systems and technologies at the 
Member State level and in third countries (especially the United States). 
2.2.2. How the controversies were addressed: the ‘proof-of-concept exercise’ 
The European Commission addressed the questions and controversies raised by the 2013 
Smart Borders package by organising a two-step ‘proof-of-concept exercise’. The current 
revised Smart Borders package is therefore considerably more thoroughly documented 
than its predecessor. The available documentation also provides significantly more 
detail about the methodology used to calculate costs and assess technical 
feasibility.  
 
There are nonetheless two caveats. First, as its designation (‘proof-of-concept’) indicates, 
the exercise was not designed to assess all possible scenarios but to demonstrate 
the validity of the Commission’s preferred policy option against a ‘no smart 
borders’ situation. As such, the observation that was made in relation to the impact 
assessment work done for the 2013 legislative package applies to the situation in 2016: 
namely, that this work serves primarily as a justification for the option that the 
Commission has committed itself to and thus lacks independent validation. This is 
all the more the case since a number of assessment tasks (especially costing) were 
conducted by organisations contracted by the European Commission. The second 
caveat concerns whether the significant efforts undertaken to support the current Smart 
Borders package should be considered as settling the question of whether Smart Borders is 
a desirable policy option for the EU’s external borders. Here it is important to recall that the 
initial impact assessment supporting the 2013 package was actually found lacking by the 
Commission’s own Impact Assessment Board and the European Parliament. Logically, 
then, this is the first time that a sufficiently detailed effort at assessing the 
package has been undertaken. 
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With these two caveats in mind, the two aspects – costing and technical feasibility – that 
were central to the controversies over the 2013 legislative package will be examined 
further. The last section (2.2.4) analyses the third component of the Smart Borders ‘proof-
of-concept’ exercise, namely the survey conducted by the FRA with travellers on their 
perceptions of different components in the foreseen system (biometrics and automated 
gates in particular). 
 
2.2.3. The cost of revised Smart Borders 
The revised Smart Border package comes with revised costs estimates: 
 
 The cost incurred to the EU budget for three years of development of the EES 
and one year of operations is estimated at EUR 480.2 million.  
 Development costs include EUR 222.1 million for the EES central system and 
NUI and EUR 172.67 million for thirty national EES systems (including, for 
those countries that already operate an EES, the cost of integration with the NUI).  
 An additional EUR 40 million is foreseen for changes to VIS (interoperability 
with VIS) and SIS II (the cost of creating an alert function for persons who have 
either not exited the EU or have not been returned at the end of the five-year data 
retention period in EES).  
 The cost to the EU budget of the first year of operation of EES is estimated to be 
EUR 45.47 million, including EUR 25.76 million for the central system and 
EUR 19.71 million for (thirty) national systems.22  
The new costing of Smart Borders is therefore significantly lower than the estimated 
EUR 1.3 billion total cost featured in the impact assessment of the 2013 package (this 
comparison includes the EUR 623 million foreseen for ‘EES 2013’ alone). It is also 
lower than the budget for Smart Borders agreed upon as part of the 2013 MFF 
negotiations, set at €791 million.  
How is this revised costing achieved? First, the decrease in the overall costing is due 
to the withdrawal of the RTP legislative proposal. In a July 2016 briefing, DG EPRS 
also notes that this decrease is due to the shortening of the system’s foreseen 
development period from five to three years.23 This is confirmed in the PwC 2014 cost 
analysis report. Another area of cost reduction identified both in the PwC cost analysis and 
in the Commission impact assessment is the shift in costs entailed by the NUI design, 
whereby development and deployment costs incurred by the thirty Smart Borders 
member states are assigned to the central level, which reduces the complexity of 
coordinating thirty different development and deployment processes.24 In the meantime, 
limits and nuances to the costing analysis should be clearly pointed out: 
 
 First, the contractor estimates that the cost of Smart Borders comes with a 
margin of error of 15-20%.25 Whether this is a minus or plus confidence range is 
not specified, but in the latter case, this means that the actual cost of Smart Borders 
could be between EUR 552 million and EUR 576 million, which is still less but 
closer to the cost of EES in the original package. 
 Second, while the cost for development and deployment over three years and for 
the first year of operation has been significantly revised, it is also important to bear 
in mind the cumulated cost of EES for the EU and Member State budgets in 
the long run. The cost analysis included in the Commission impact assessment 
                                                 
22 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 2, pp. 65-66. 
23 EPRS (2016), Smart Borders: EU Entry/Exit System, Brussels: European Parliament. 
24 PwC, Cost analysis, op. cit., p. 9. 
25 Ibid., p. 12. At the same time, the phrasing of the cost analysis is particularly ambiguous. The cost analysis, the 
PwC report notes, ‘assesses the cautious options … with cautious being understood as the one that would avoid 
underestimating the final cost’ (12). 
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indicates that the total foreseen cumulated cost of EES over a period of 10 years 
would be EUR 1.013 billion. These ten years include a three-year development 
period (2017-2019) and a seven-year operation period (2020-2026). It is unclear 
whether the 15-20% margin of error applies to this figure. Should this be the case, 
the cumulated cost of developing, deploying and operating the EES could be 
between EUR 1.165 to 1.215 billion for the period 2017-2026. 
2.2.4. The technical feasibility of revised Smart Borders 
The technical feasibility of the revised Smart Borders package has been examined in 2014-
2015 through the PwC technical study and the pilot project led by eu-LISA. The technical 
analysis envisaged a situation where both EES and RTP would be developed and deployed. 
The key parameters of the technical analysis conducted by PwC and eu-LISA are as follows: 
  
 As reported by PwC, the technical study mostly relied on consultations with 
stakeholders (workshops, interviews, feedback on draft deliverables), desk 
research and on-site visits, as well as the results of a data collection survey 
(organised by Member States in May 2014) on border crossings (numbers, types) 
and the categories of persons involved (EU/EEA/CH citizens, visa-exempt and visa-
holding third-country nationals).26 
 As reported by eu-LISA, the pilot project relied on a combination of operational 
testing (either in the context of the regular operations of a border crossing point or 
as a stand-alone process where the test was not part of regular operations) and 
desk research (literature review, interviews and workshops). The pilot project 
further involved consultations with stakeholders.27 
In response to comments made on the 2013 package, then, and at least in the pilot project 
phase, assessment involved testing the various options in real-life conditions and 
various contexts. According to figures provided by eu-LISA, the tests involved 18 
different border crossing point locations across 12 Member States, as well as 58 000 third-
country national travellers. Furthermore, testing actually led to discarding some options 
originally considered, chiefly iris enrolment.  
 
In the meantime, some limits and nuances to the findings on the technical feasibility of 
Smart Borders must be highlighted. First, some aspects of technical feasibility were 
left out of the various studies’ purview from the onset. The PwC technical study 
notes that it ‘does not systematically address issues related to an implementation plan’ 
and only focuses in this regard on the question of whether biometrics should be introduced 
from the start at border checks or whether they should be deferred for the EES.28 In fact, 
the only information available about the actual implementation of the Smart 
Borders measures is the cost analysis. In similar fashion, issues likely to arise on the 
launch of EES, such as what to do with travellers who might have crossed the EU’s external 
borders before the rollout of the system, are not dealt with. Likewise, eu-LISA stresses 
that the scope of the pilot project was limited to a subset of options outlined in 
the Technical Study on the basis of the Terms of Reference drafted by the 
European Commission.29 In other words, the results of the pilot are less indicative of 
the feasibility of having Smart Borders than a test of the specific preferred option 
pursued by the European Commission. 
 
This observation leads to a second point, which is that there are some gaps and leaps in 
logic in the technical assessment of Smart Borders. A key example here concerns the 
examination of issues related to law enforcement aspects in the PwC technical 
study. The contractor, who was asked to provide a basis in evidence for law enforcement 
                                                 
26 PwC, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
27 eu-LISA (2015), Smart Borders Pilot Project – Technical Report Annexes (Volume 2), Tallinn: eu-LISA, pp. 12-
15. 
28 PwC, Final Report, op. cit., p. 26. 
29 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., p. 15. 
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access to Smart Border systems, used data on law enforcement access to VIS from 1 
September 2013 to 31 March 2014.30 The PwC technical study finds that VIS was 
searched for law enforcement purposes 11 times per day on average. Only five 
searches over the seven-month data collection period involved searches for 
fingerprints, and only one authentication by fingerprints occurred. There are some 
mitigating factors: VIS was not fully rolled out at that stage and Member States were still in 
the process of deploying the organisational and technical infrastructure. The contractor 
nonetheless concludes that ‘it is reasonable to assume that access by law 
enforcement authorities to EES would remain limited, as is currently the case for 
VIS’.31 Despite this preliminary finding, however, the study then proceeds to develop a full 
examination of the requirements, possibilities and conditions for law enforcement access to 
EES. It is necessary to ask, given this observation, whether law enforcement access to 
EES is actually sufficiently grounded in evidence to be implemented, beyond the 
fact that it is technically feasible.  
 
Examining the evidence basis for law enforcement access to EES requires that the most up-
to-date information on law enforcement access to VIS, published by eu-LISA in its July 
2016 ‘VIS report’, is taken into consideration.32 The VIS report covers the period from 
September 2013 to September 2015, and its key findings on law enforcement access can 
be summarised as follows33: 
 
 At the time of publication, four Member States (France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden) had 
not yet reported their designated access points to eu-LISA; 
 By the end of the reporting period, twelve Member States did not report any 
activity on the use of VIS for the purpose of preventing, detecting and 
investigating terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences. This 
group comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia. The reason (lack of 
reporting or no actual use) is unspecified; 
 By the end of the reporting period, eleven Member States reported a total 
of 9,474 searches performed by law enforcement authorities for the 
purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offences and 
other serious criminal offences – roughly 35 searches per day. This group 
includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland. Out of these, three Member 
States reported less than 15 searches (Finland, the Netherlands, Slovenia). The 
largest users, according to their self-reporting, were the German (38% of the total), 
Hungarian (26%), Polish (14%), and Spanish (11%) authorities – four Member 
States accounting for about 90% of total searches; 
 eu-LISA estimates the total number of law enforcement users of VIS to be 
more than 1,200, for a total number of 135 access points reported by Member 
States; 
 The eu-LISA report does not provide information on the volume of searches in 
VIS for law enforcement purposes that involved fingerprints. 
With the benefit of a longer reporting period, during which the rollout of VIS was 
completed, the VIS report shows that, overall, the average number of searches for law 
enforcement purposes in the system is three times higher than during the period when 
the PwC Technical Study on Smart Borders was realised. In the meantime, the volume of 
searches is very unevenly distributed. The authorities of four Member States total 
                                                 
30 PwC, Final Report, op. cit., p. 216. 
31 PwC, Final Report, op. cit., p. 217. 
32 eu-LISA (2016) VIS Report pursuant to Article 50(3) of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and VIS Report pursuant 
to Article 17(3) of Council Decision 2008/633/JHA. Tallinn: eu-LISA, July. 
33 Ibid, pp. 23-24. 
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approximately 90% of reported searches, while more than half of the Member States 
did not report any activity. Furthermore, the VIS report does not present information on 
how many of the reported searches involved fingerprints. To some extent, these findings 
can be considered as an artefact of uneven or incomplete reporting, although this 
observation raises questions in itself. It is nonetheless difficult to draw any conclusive 
evidence, by analogy, as to the usefulness and proportionality of law enforcement 
access to EES. This is all the more the case as the depth of information and evidence 
available from VIS is limited at this time. 
 
A third point concerns the extent to which the current findings of the technical 
assessment of Smart Borders can be generalised. The focus here is very much on the 
operational testing conducted by eu-LISA. The testing of biometric options (fingerprints, 
facial images, iris scans) was conducted across a variety of locations, including land and 
sea borders that were an area of concern in earlier controversies about the Smart Border 
package. Yet the testing of ABC gates and self-service kiosks, key elements for 
Smart Borders achieving its objective of facilitation, has been much more limited 
and to some extent inconclusive.34 ABC gates, according to eu-LISA, were tested mainly 
at air borders at some of the largest EU international hubs (excluding Heathrow, United 
Kingdom) but only at a single sea border and only two land borders, including one train 
station (Gare du Nord, Paris, France). Self-service kiosks were tested at only two air 
borders, one sea border (Helsinki, Finland), and one land border (Sillamäe, Estonia). For 
both technologies, there is a reported discrepancy in quality, duration of passage, 
and maturity of technology between air, land, and sea borders. Air borders show the 
best results across the board, while sea borders show the worst results for ABC gates 
and land borders the worst results for self-service kiosks. While there are 
understandable limits to operational testing, it is worth noting that the use of ABC gates 
and self-service kiosks is a key component in the Commission’s argument that Smart 
Borders will facilitate (in the sense of speeding up) border crossings, one of the main 
objectives of the package as it currently stands. 
 
2.2.5. Travellers and Smart Borders: analysis of the results from the FRA survey 
The third component in the Smart Borders ‘proof-of-concept’ exercise is the survey directed 
at third-country nationals that the FRA undertook as part of the pilot project led by eu-
LISA.35 More specifically, FRA designed to examine ‘attitudes towards potential fundamental 
rights issues related to collecting, storing and processing biometric data in the context of 
border crossing’.36 The survey also asked about specific aspects of Smart Borders that raise 
questions with regard to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including Article 1 
(dignity), Article 7 (respect for private and family life), Article 8 (right to protection of 
personal data), and Article 21 (non-discrimination). Fieldwork, which was contracted out to 
Eticas Research & Consulting, took place between 14 July 2015 and 22 October 2015; a 
total of 1 234 persons were interviewed. 
 
Overall, the FRA’s interpretation of the survey results is:  
  
 that most respondents were ‘comfortable’ with providing biometrics at border 
crossing, although ‘about 30% believe that biometrics represent an 
interference with their private life’. Depending on the particular biometric 
identifier used (iris scans triggered the strongest reaction), ‘between 22% and 
32% … feel that the provision of biometric data is potentially humiliating’. 
In this respect, respondents seem to consider that a check with a border 
guard is less humiliating than providing biometrics; 
                                                 
34 For a quick overview, see eu-LISA (2015), Smart Borders Pilot: The results in brief, Tallinn: eu-LISA, pp. 8-10. 
35 The report on this survey is annexed in eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project. 
36 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., p. 311. 
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 that most respondents report ‘trust in the reliability of biometric technologies’. This 
is mitigated by the fact that ‘more than half of the respondents believe that they will 
not be able (or do not know if they will be able) to cross the border in case the 
technology does not work properly’. Half of the respondents, furthermore, 
believe that it would be difficult to correct mistakes in the data. Still on the 
topic of trust, the FRA reports that ‘two thirds of respondents either believe that 
biometric technologies could harm their health or show great uncertainty on this 
issue’. As a final observation on trust, ‘there is a widely held view that automated 
systems could cause less discrimination – for example on the basis of race or 
ethnicity – compared to checks carried out in person by border guards’; 
 that most respondents (80%) ‘consider it important to be informed on the purpose 
of collecting and processing their personal data’. In particular, more than two-thirds 
of respondents ‘would exclude children’ (i.e. minors) from the obligation to provide 
fingerprints.37 
The (self-reported) Commission’s response to the results of the survey has been to include 
‘provisions for correction and redress of data to the data subjects’.38 These, in any case, 
would have had to be included under EU data protection rules. For the Commission, 
however, the main lesson drawn is that ‘the study results confirm the acceptability of 
biometrics and a wider support for fingerprints and facial image as opposed to the iris 
scan’ (one of the technical options included for evaluation in the pilot project).39 
 
A survey is notoriously difficult to implement and interpret, and for reasons of space it is 
not possible to question in detail respondent answers and the FRA’s interpretation. It is 
important to note, however, that the FRA’s conclusions are more nuanced than the 
Commission’s interpretation. The Agency’s conclusion highlights that the survey reflects 
’travellers’ perception’ and stresses that ‘violations of fundamental rights may occur 
regardless of whether the individual consents or not to a certain treatment, 
particularly in light of limited rights awareness’.40 In other words, the fact that a 
measure or technology is acceptable to a broader or target public does not mean 
that it is compatible with fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
‘Comfort’ with biometrics, furthermore, may also be the result of limited knowledge 
about what the technology does and what happens to data collected this way. 
When confronted with the result that a majority of respondents felt that automated 
systems could be less discriminatory than border guards, the Agency puts this down to a 
belief among respondents that ‘automated systems could be programmed to identify 
individuals using sensitive data such as race, ethnicity or health’ – which points to the fact 
that respondents may well have been less than familiar with what can be done 
with such automated systems.41 This seems to be confirmed by some of the other 
survey results, such as views about biometrics and health or the widespread disagreement 
about the fingerprinting of minors. Likewise, much more could be said about the choice of 
phrasing the dignity-related question in terms of ‘humiliation’ (‘Please tell use which of the 
following situation might be humiliating or not’). ‘Humiliation’ is a very strong choice of 
words: as the FRA itself notes, one could speak of an offense to dignity, a lack of respect, 
of being degraded, and so on. Respondents who report not feeling humiliated might still 
experience unease or find it disrespectful to treat travellers this way. A more granular 
reading of results for this question also shows that respondents from Asia and 
Africa are the most likely to consider any situation involving biometrics as 
humiliating, which could suggest that the degree of ‘comfort’ with biometrics and their 
impact on human dignity might also be tied to other and more widespread 
                                                 
37 All excerpts are from eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., pp. 334-335. 
38 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 2, p. 12. 
39 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 2, p. 12. 
40 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., p. 334. 
41 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., p. 307. 
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experiences of racial discrimination in the European context, which could be less the 
case for travellers from North America and Europe.42 
 
The examination of the FRA survey leads to the same observation as the one for the 
analysis of the assessment of the costing and technical feasibility assessment of the 2016 
Smart Borders package. Since the results are ambiguous and open to interpretation, they 
do not constitute a compelling case supporting the policy option selected by the European 
Commission. Moreover, favourable public opinion towards the collection, storage and 
access to personal data does not in itself make these measures compliant with fundamental 
rights.  
 
2.2.6. Is the revised Smart Borders package a proportionate measure? 
The work done to support the revised Smart Border package gives important information 
on the technical feasibility of the initiative, on how sound it could be from a budget 
perspective, and on the attitudes of border crossers towards the technologies it would use. 
What remains to be discussed, however, is the extent to which the proposed measures 
are proportionate: that they, in other words, do not go beyond what is necessary 
in terms of EU actions at the EU level to meet defined objectives.  
 
Proportionality with regard to fundamental rights is examined in the second part of this 
study. What is examined here is proportionality in its broader sense, namely the fit 
between objectives and proposed measures. The difficulty of doing so for the Smart 
Borders package is that it combines three separate objectives: improving the 
management of the EU’s external borders (facilitation); implementing the EU’s migration 
and visa policy (overstayers); and reinforcing internal security (law enforcement access). 
These three objectives are examined in turn in order to reach a general conclusion on the 
proportionality of the package. 
 
The first objective of Smart Borders is improving the management of the EU’s external 
borders by letting travellers, including third-country nationals, clear passport and 
immigration controls more quickly and lightening the workload for border guards. To recap 
earlier points, the proposals contribute to this objective by: 
 
 replacing the stamping obligation by an electronic registration of entries 
and exits, thus also enabling the possibility for a prompter assessment by border 
guards and for better information to travellers; 
 providing a harmonised legal basis for the use of automated processes such 
as ABC gates and self-service kiosks. 
The impact assessment of the 2013 Smart Borders package noted likely, if minor, time 
gains in using EES as opposed to the status quo option, particularly upon entry.43 The 
findings of the ‘proof-of-concept exercise’ and their summary in the impact assessment 
documentation accompanying the 2016 package are more elusive on these time gains. The 
preferred option presented by the European Commission actually has a negative 
to null effect on border-crossing time given the obligation to collect biometric data (or 
pull it from VIS) at first enrolment.44 In fact, as the conclusions of the eu-LISA pilot 
highlight, time gains can be expected only from the use of automated processes 
such as ABC gates and self-service kiosks. The same conclusions, however, stress that 
there is still a requirement for ABC gates to be supervised by a border guard. 
Reliance on self-service kiosks, according to eu-LISA, would reduce border crossing times if 
specific conditions about where such kiosks are located can be met. In the meantime, the 
use of self-service kiosks means that ‘some tasks are delegated [from the border 
                                                 
42 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., p. 322. 
43 COM(2013) 47 final, pp. 64-68. 
44 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 1, pp. 55-59. 
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guard] to the traveller’, which raises questions as to the actual improvement in 
the border crossing conditions for travellers.45  
 
This calls for two remarks. First, the use of automated processes is harmonised with 
the SBC/EES proposal, but there is no requirement for Member States to 
implement them. Therefore, the reliance on automated processes may be likely but 
cannot be guaranteed. Second, the collection and storage of fingerprints is 
disproportionate for the objective of replacing the stamping of passports or for 
enabling the use of automated processes. These objectives can be obtained by 
verifying a live facial image of the traveller with the facial image contained on an electronic 
passport chip. Visual verification by a border guard is sufficient in cases where travellers do 
not carry an e-passport or when the means to verify the identity of a traveller by means of 
a facial image are not available. For the purpose of replacing the physical stamping 
obligation, the storing of data on the identity of travellers, travel document and visa 
information, as well as travel history for a period of 181 days is sufficient. On the other 
hand, the harmonised legal basis for relying on automation is proportionate given the 
growing reliance on ABC gates and self-service kiosks at major border-crossing points. 
 
The second objective of the Smart Borders package is better implementation of the EU’s 
migration and visa policy. The contribution of the envisaged measures mainly deals with 
the issue of overstaying. The European Commission’s assumption is that EES will ‘allow 
[authorities] to apprehend irregular migrants more efficiently’, ‘support the identification of 
irregular migrants’ and in turn ‘facilitate the return process’.46 
 
The proportionality of EES as a measure for dealing with overstay can be 
questioned on a number of grounds. First, there is no accurate or unambiguous data 
on overstay in the EU of visa-exempt and visa-holding third-country nationals 
currently exists. The most recent compilation of data provided by Eurostat, from October 
2015:  
 
 shows an increase of about 46% in the number of non-EU citizens apprehended 
in relation to irregular stays between 2013 and 2014, peaking at around 626 000 
persons. The Eurostat analysis notes, however, that this figure concerns 
apprehensions and does not necessarily reflect a growth in the number of 
non-EU citizens staying irregularly in the EU, as this change can also be linked 
to public policy changes in Member States;  
 shows that 90% of apprehensions are recorded in ten Member States, which 
can be due to gaps in reporting but also strongly suggests that this is an unevenly 
distributed issue; 
 does not provide any information as to how many of the persons apprehended 
entered the EU on a short-stay Schengen visa or as visa-exempt short-stay visitors. 
In other words, there is no information as to the actual scope of the overstay 
problem that EES sets out to address.47 
The second claim made in relation to the EES objective of contributing to the EU’s migration 
policy is that it will facilitate the return process. The cost analysis attached to the Smart 
Borders impact assessment goes so far as to monetise the benefits of Smart Borders in this 
respect, foreseeing a gain for immigration services of EUR 235.3 million by operation year 7 
of the EES (2026). This gain is derived from fines and a reduction in labour hours spent on 
identifying overstayers and implementing return decisions.48 This take on return policy, 
however, is misleading for the following reasons: 
                                                 
45 eu-LISA, Smart Borders Pilot Project, op. cit., pp. 163-164. 
46 COM(2016) 194 final, p. 3. 
47 Eurostat (2015), Statistics on Enforcement of Immigration Legislation, Luxembourg: Eurostat, available online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation#cite_ref-4 (accessed August 2016). 
48 SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 3, p. 111. 
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 Available statistics (using Eurostat reporting) show that in 2014 only 36% of 
return decisions in the EU had been executed, with about 169 000 persons 
returned. Between 2008 and 2014, there was a 22.1% decrease in the total number 
of orders to leave EU Member States. There is no single discernible reason for this 
trend. The identification of persons and their nationality is certainly an issue, but it 
is not the only one. There is also a lack of information on the proportion of return 
decisions concerning persons who entered the EU for a short stay. Once again, 
there is no clear evidence as to the actual scope of the identification 
problem that EES, and especially the collection and storage of fingerprints 
in EES, is meant to address. 
 Return policy is regularly identified as a costly endeavour by Member States. For 
instance, a November 2015 report by the French Senate’s Commission des Lois 
indicates that there is no existing assessment of the actual costs of return policy. 
The cost to the budget of the French state alone, according to one 2009 
evaluation, was EUR 232 million per year, which translates to EUR 12 000 
per returned person. Another assessment from 2009, which included expenses 
related to detention of persons in a situation of irregular stay but excluded other 
costs such as legal procedures, found a total annual cost to the French budget 
of EUR 415.2 million.49  
Two conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the assessment of the actual contribution 
of EES to return policy lacks supporting evidence. There is no reliable data on the 
number of persons residing irregularly in the EU who entered for a short stay. 
Second, the assumption that more detections will lead to a better implementation 
of EU return policy (that is, Member States executing more return orders) appears 
to be unfounded since there is already a gap between the number of people 
apprehended for irregular stays and executed returns. Finally, the notion that there 
would be a monetary benefit in using the EES does not take into account the fact that 
a hypothetical increase in the detection of overstayers could lead to a significant 
increase in the workload for immigration services and courts, and therefore in 
spending. As such, and as a measure to deal with overstay, the EES in its current shape 
cannot be considered proportionate. 
 
The third objective of the Smart Borders package is to contribute to the internal security of 
the EU and the Member States by providing law enforcement and Europol access to EES. As 
discussed above (2.2.4), the impact assessment accompanying the revised Smart 
Borders package does not provide irrefutable evidence that establishing EES with 
law enforcement access from the onset is proportionate with the objective of 
reinforcing internal security, in particular with regard to counterterrorism and curbing 
serious and organised crime. In the absence of additional and more long-term data on the 
actual use of existing systems by Member State law enforcement agencies, in particular 
VIS as well as the upcoming EU Passenger Name Record (EU-PNR), the case for law 
enforcement access to EES rests entirely on a measure that the EES regulation 
itself introduces, namely the collection and storage of biometrics (fingerprints in 
particular).  
 
There are two further points to underscore in this respect. First, the only additional 
category of persons that law enforcement agencies currently do not have access to but 
which they would through EES would be visa-exempt third-country nationals entering 
(and exiting) the EU for short stays. The question raised by this observation is whether 
the expense and effort entailed by the development, deployment, and functioning of EES is 
proportionate to this objective. Second, as argued in the April 2016 communication, 
‘Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Border Security’, the revised Smart 
                                                 
49 Sénat, Commission des lois (2015), Avis n°170 sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2016, TOME III: 
Immigration, intégration et nationalité, présenté par François-Noël Buffet, Paris: Sénat, Session ordinaire de 
2015-2016, 19 November 2015, pp. 18-19. 
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Border package is framed by the European Commission as part of an effort to ‘join 
up and strengthen the EU’s border management, migration and security 
cooperation frameworks and information tools in a comprehensive manner’.50 The 
communication foresees further measures to enhance interoperability between information 
systems set up for law enforcement, border control, visa, and asylum purposes. A key 
aspect of the Commission’s reasoning is that there are data and information ‘gaps’ in 
EU border control, in the sense that not all persons who cross the EU’s external 
borders have their data recorded in one way or another in EU information 
systems.51 While there are legitimate concerns as to how the complex landscape of EU 
information systems in the areas of freedom, security and justice can be navigated by 
users and data subjects alike, collecting and storing data on all border crossers for 
the sake of closing ‘gaps’ appears to be in breach of the general principle of 
proportionality, and as such cannot support the adoption of EES.52 This is a policy issue 
as much as a legal matter, and in particular with regard to compliance with fundamental 
rights, which is examined in the next section. 
 
                                                 
50 COM(2016) 205 final, p. 2. 
51 COM(2016) 205 final, p. 3. 
52 As demonstrated by several studies commissioned by the European Parliament and in particular the LIBE 
committee (see in particular D. Bigo, S. Carrera, B. Hayes, N. Hernanz, and J. Jeandesboz (2012), Evaluating 
Current and Forthcoming Proposals on JHA Databases and a Smart Borders System at EU External Borders, 
Brussels: European Parliament, PE 462.513). 
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3. COMPATIBILITY WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The large-scale collection and storage of personal data, including biometric data, 
form an interference with the right to private life under the ECHR, and hence also 
under the CFR. 
 Given the special nature of biometric data, the indiscriminate, massive collection 
and potential use of it constitute a particularly serious infringement.  
 The proposal fails the proportionality and necessity test as it concerns both the 
objective of migration and border management as well as criminal law enforcement.  
 
The main issue with regard to the compatibility with fundamental rights of the 
Commission’s proposal for an EES relates to whether such a system would comply with 
Article 7 (the right to respect for private life) and Article 8 (the right to the protection of 
personal data) of the CFR, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
3.1. Smart Borders and interference with the right to private life 
3.1.1. Existence of an interference 
There is no doubt that the large-scale collection and storage of personal data, 
including biometric data, forms an interference with the right to private life under 
the ECHR, and hence also under the CFR.53  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that ‘the mere storing of data relating 
to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 
8’.54 The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding.55 Rather, 
the access to that data by law enforcement staff forms a further interference with the right 
to privacy.56 In terms of finding interference, it is irrelevant whether the information 
collected is sensitive or not or whether or not persons concerned have been inconvenienced 
in any way.57  
 
In S & Marper v the UK, the ECtHR held that fingerprint records constitute personal data 
containing ‘certain external identification features’ comparable to photographs or voice 
samples.58 They contain ‘unique information about the individual concerned [sic] allowing 
his or her identification [to be made] with precision in a wide range of circumstances’.59 
Fingerprints, as such, belong to a special category of more sensitive data.60 In relation to 
the decentralised storage of fingerprints in biometric passports, the ECJ likewise held that 
the processing of fingerprints constituted ‘a threat’ to the right to respect for private life 
and the right to protection of personal data, as fingerprints play an important role in the 
field of identifying persons in general.61  
                                                 
53 Article 52(3) CFR. 
54 S. and Marper v the United Kingdom ECHR (2008) 1581, para. 67. 
55 Amann v Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECHR 2000-II, at para. 69, and S. and Marper v the UK. Cases 
C:465/00, C:138/01 and C:139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, para. 75. 
56 Leander v Sweden, ECHR (1987), Series A, no. 116, at para. 48. Joined Cases C-293/12 (Digital Rights Ireland) 
and C-594/12 (Kärtner Landesregierug), EU:C:2014:238, para. 35. Hereafter referred to as Digital Rights Ireland. 
57 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, para. 75; Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 
33. 
58 S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 81. 
59 S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 84. 
60 S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 103. 
61 Schwarz, EU:C:2013:670, paras. 23-30. 
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Given the special nature of biometric data, the indiscriminate, massive collection 
and potential use of it constitute a particularly serious infringement. 
 
As the EDPS has pointed out, ‘The fact that data will be retained for law enforcement 
purposes and subsequently used without the subscriber or registered user being informed 
is likely to generate in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private 
lives are the subject of constant surveillance’.62 The data included in the EES would not 
only allow for personal identification but could also help establish precise travel patterns 
and carry the risk of profiling on the basis of origin.    
3.1.2. Justification of the interference 
Under Article 8(2) of the CFR, data can only be processed with the consent of the persons 
concerned or if there is a legitimate basis laid down in law. Since the EES makes the 
taking of fingerprints and a facial image a prerequisite for entering the Schengen 
area, third-country nationals are not offered a free choice, so consent cannot be 
considered given.63  
 
The analysis therefore shifts to the question of whether there is a legitimate basis in law for 
the EES. Any interference with the right to the protection of one’s personal data, or right to 
respect for private life for that matter, must be justified under the Charter’s general 
exception clause. Article 52(1) of the CFR requires that any limitation is provided 
for by law and must respect the essence of the right. Limitations must be 
proportionate; they are only allowed if necessary and if they genuinely meet the 
objectives of a general interest recognized by the EU or the need to protect the 
rights of others. 
 
Digital Rights Ireland is the key case in which the ECJ applied Article 52(1) of the CFR to 
articles 7 and 8 of the CFR. The ECJ annulled the EU’s Data Retention Directive for 
constituting a disproportionate infringement on the right to privacy and data protection.64 
This case also guides the analysis of the ECJ’s Advocates General (AG) in two recent 
opinions on pending cases, Tele2 Sverige AB on national data retention laws and Opinion 
1/15 on the EU-Canada agreement on the exchange of Passenger Name Records.65 
 
The EES would need to satisfy five cumulative requirements in order to justify the 
interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR.66 It must: 
  
 have a legal basis; 
 observe the essence of the rights enshrined in the Charter; 
 genuinely pursue an objective of general interest; 
 be proportionate; 
 be necessary. 
When it concerns the protection of personal data, the Court has moreover held 
that derogations and limitations cannot exceed what is strictly necessary.67  
 
                                                 
62 G. Buttarelli (2015), ‘A Data Protection perspective on the Smart Borders Package’, Working Party on Frontiers, 
19 November 2015. 
63 Schwarz, EU:C:2013:670, para. 33. 
64 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, note 56.  
65 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe of 19 July 2016 in Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och 
telestyrelsen and C-698/15 Secretary of State for Home Department v Tom Watson and Others, EU:C:2016:572. 
Opinion of AG Mengozzi of 8 September 2016 on the request for an Opinion 1/15, EU:C:2016:656. 
66 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 46, with reference to the Schecke-test. 
67 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 46, with reference to Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers 
(IPI), EU:C:2013:715, para. 39.  
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3.2.  Legal basis, essence of rights and general interest 
The first three requirements for a justified interference with Articles 7 and 8 of 
the CFR appear to be satisfied.  
 
The EES Regulation would constitute the legal basis in law. Moreover, the proposal seems 
to be ‘sufficiently clear and precise’ in providing adequate guidance as to the circumstances 
and conditions under which authorities can restrict the rights at stake, thus protecting 
against arbitrary interference.68 The data to be collected are clear, precise, and 
exhaustively listed.69 The extent to which the proposal proves problematic in providing 
sufficient safeguards to effectively protect data protection rights against unlawful access 
and use will be discussed under the necessity requirement below.70  
 
There are no indications that the EES would affect the essence of the right to 
privacy or the right to personal data protection since the proposal aims to limit 
the amount of data collected. It limits, for instance, the number of fingerprints when 
compared to the 2013 proposal; it puts in place a set of safeguards aimed at protecting 
personal data and privacy; and it contains provisions on the advanced deletion of data.  
 
The EES pursues two sets of distinct objectives: one related to border and migration 
management and the other related to law enforcement efficacy in curbing terrorist offences 
and other serious criminal offences.71 The ECJ has recognised both aims as objectives 
of general interest.72 However, the ECJ has emphasized that an objective of general 
interest, no matter how fundamental, cannot in itself render a measure justified.73 
 
 
3.3.  Proportionality and necessity 
Whether the EES’s interference with the right to respect for private life and the 
right to data protection can be justified revolves around the question of whether 
the infringement is proportionate and necessary.  
 
The principle of proportionality requires that acts of EU institutions be appropriate for 
attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question and that they do 
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those 
objectives (that, in other words, no less restrictive means are available).74 As pointed out 
above, the ECJ has also held that interferences with the right to data protection must not 
only be necessary, but strictly necessary. 
 
These requirements must be considered in turn for both sets of purposes, as the collection, 
transfer and use of data constitute separate interferences requiring separate 
justifications.75 Moreover, with the introduction of additional legal bases  (Articles 87(2)(a) 
and 88(2)(a) TFEU), the collection of data for the objective of criminal law enforcement can 
no longer be considered secondary to the aim of border and migration management. 
 
                                                 
68 AG Mengozzi in Opinion 1/15, EU:C:2016:65, para. 193, with reference to Fernández Martínez v Spain, 
CE:ECHR:2014:0612JUD005603007, para. 117.  
69 Articles 14-18, COM(2016) 194 final. 
70 Following the approach in Digital Rights Ireland rather than that of AG Mengozzi in Opinion 1/15. 
71 Article 5, COM(2016) 194 final. 
72 Schwarz, EU:C:2013:670, paras. 36-38; Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, paras. 41-44. 
73 No attention will be paid here to the Commission’s reference to the refugee crisis in its impact assessment 
(COM(2016) 115 final, p. 2). It will be clear, however, that the changed context of the refugee crisis, which is 
unconnected to the scope of the EES, cannot serve in any way as to provide a legitimate objective. 
74 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 46. 
75 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 35. 
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3.3.1. Collection and access for the purpose of border and migration management 
The objectives of the EES that can be grouped under border and migration management 
are enhancing the efficiency of border checks through the calculation of the period of 
authorised stay; identifying and detecting overstayers, both at the border and within 
Schengen territory; electronically register and check refusals of entry; increasing 
possibilities for return; enabling consulates to access information on prior travel when 
handling new visa requests; informing third-country nationals of the authorised duration of 
their stay; gathering statistics on entry and exit; and countering identity fraud. When these 
purposes are compared to the objectives of the 2013 proposal, it seems as if there is a 
stronger emphasis on the efficiency of border controls.76 One new objective that has 
consequences for the proposed retention period involves access to the EES by consulates 
for the purpose of examining prior travel (in order to compensate for the removal of the 
entry-exit stamps in passports).77  
3.3.1.1. Appropriateness 
The EES seems to be an appropriate tool to facilitate the work of border guards. 
Entry-exit stamps may not always be legible or may be absent in the case of recently 
acquired passports making the calculation of authorised periods of stays more difficult. The 
inclusion of biometrics may further facilitate the verification of identity. In this regard the 
ECJ has recognised the appropriateness of the inclusion of biometric data in EU passports 
as a means of countering forgery, as such facilitating the work of border guards in 
assessing the authenticity of the document and preventing irregular migration.78 Although 
the EES does not have as its purpose to combat forgery, combatting identity fraud is one of 
its stated purposes. The EES may also be an appropriate tool to gather statistics on exit 
and entry. 
 
However, as the Article 29 Working Party and others have previously argued in relation to 
the 2013 proposal, the EES would only be capable of registering overstay but not locating 
overstayers within the Schengen area.79 The Commission’s impact assessment 
accompanying the 2013 proposal noted that the EES may have a deterrent effect but also 
conceded that it could have the effect of leading overstayers to not leave at all.80 Moreover, 
it could result in irregular migrants changing strategies by opting for irregular entry rather 
than applying for a visa at all.81 Finally, the mere identification of overstayers may not 
actually contribute to return given the very common situation in which the third country 
does not cooperate in return proceedings.82  
3.3.1.2. Necessity 
In relation to the purpose of gathering statistics on exit and entry, it seems difficult to 
maintain that the collection of personalised biometric data is necessary. As the Court held 
in Watson and Belmann, EU law does not prevent Member States from adopting measures 
that enable authorities to have an exact knowledge of population movements affecting their 
territory.83 Since this applies to EU citizens it applies a fortiori to third-country nationals. 
That does not, however, mean that the collection and storage of individualised information 
                                                 
76 Article 4, COM(2013) 95 final. 
77 Article 5(f) COM(2016) 194 final. 
78 Schwarz, EU:C:2013:670, para. 41. 
79 WP 29 (2013), Opinion 05/2013 on Smart Borders, 00952/13. 
80 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Preparing the Next Steps in Border Management in the European 
Union – Impact Assessment’, SEC(2008) 153, p. 48. 
81 S. Peers (2008), ‘Proposed New EU Border Control Systems’, PE 408.296, p. 9. 
82 See WP 29 (2013), Opinion 05/2013 on Smart Borders; Meijers Committee (2013), ‘Note on the Smart Borders 
proposals’ 3 May 2013, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/may/eu-meijers-committee-smart-borders.pdf 
and EDPS (2015), ‘Formal comments of the EDPS on the European Commission Public Consultation on Smart 
Borders’, at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comments/2015/1
5-11-03_Comments_smart_borders_EN.pdf. 
83 Watson and Belmann (1976), ECR 1185, para. 17 (EU:C:1976:106); and Huber (2008), ECR I-9705, para. 63 
(EU:C:2008:724).  
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in a database is per se necessary, as only anonymous information is required to attain this 
objective.84 Secondly, the calculation of stay is currently done using entry-exit 
stamps and the Schengen calculator. In a Presidency questionnaire, all Member States 
indicated that currently this is the most effective way of determining overstay, both inland 
and at the border.85 By doing away with the obligation to stamp passports upon 
entry and exit – despite the fact that Member States raised concern about this abolition – 
the proposal itself creates the need for a more restrictive measure.86 The argument 
that the EES will be more efficient than the stamping obligation needs to be balanced 
against the extent of the interference with the right to respect for private life and the 
protection of personal data of the EES. This is all the more so, as the proposal’s abolition of 
entry/exit stamps has further consequences. It has created the need for consular 
authorities to have access to the EES in order to check the prior travel history of visa 
applicants.  
 
Some elements that led the Court to annul the Data Retention Directive are also relevant 
for assessing the strict necessity required of the EES.    
 
First of all, when it comes to the objective of countering overstay and irregular 
migration, the system covers in a generalised manner all third-country nationals 
entering or exiting the Union for short-stay travel without any distinction made about 
the potential risk of overstay. This is particularly problematic since the majority of 
overstayers come from countries covered by a visa obligation, which means that they can 
already be identified through VIS.87 It is difficult to maintain that the system is 
strictly necessary for nationals of countries not under a visa obligation. In any 
case, it remains unclear why the inclusion of biometric for this category of 
travellers would be strictly necessary as opposed to the registration of 
alphanumeric data. It is relevant to recall that the Court in Schwarz argued that the use 
of biometric data in passports did not go beyond what was necessary because the data 
remained stored only in the passport itself and could not be used for other purposes than to 
prevent illegal entry, which is obviously not the case for the EES.88 There is some 
disagreement as to whether Digital Rights Ireland should be interpreted as rendering such 
a generalised obligation per se as failing to meet the strict necessity requirement. In light 
of the Court’s subsequent emphasis on sufficient safeguards being put in place in order to 
prevent unlawful access and abuse, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe does not hold that view.89 
 
Second, as under the Data Retention Directive, the EES would entail automatic processing. 
The sheer number of authorities and consulates having access to the EES could also pose a 
a significant risk of unlawful access. However, these concerns are mitigated since eu-
LISA would be responsible for technical and organisational measures to achieve a 
high level of security; moreover, specific security rules are imposed on national 
authorities. In addition, the proposal provides for supervision by the EDPS and national 
data protection authorities, which shall be given sufficient resources to meet that purpose. 
Moreover, as opposed to the Data Retention Directive, the EES proposal provides for 
substantive and procedural conditions relating to access to the data by the authorities as 
well as requirements in relation to data security. 
3.3.1.3. Effective remedy 
Article 46 of the EES proposal maintains the previously proposed provisions on remedies. 
This means that there is only the right to request access, correction or removal of data. 
There is no explicit remedy against incorrect data or improper use of data. Moreover, the 
proposal leaves it to the Member States to determine whether an action lies with a court or 
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85 Council Document 8744/15. 
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88 Schwarz, EU:C:2013:670, paras. 60-62. 
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with the competent authorities, which falls short of the obligation in Article 47 of the CFR to 
provide an effective judicial remedy.90 Such a remedy is only explicitly provided for in 
Article 36(5) and (6) for third-country nationals who, prior to the expiry of the data 
retention, come to fall outside the scope of the EES (by, for instance, acquiring EU 
citizenship). The unqualified obligation to provide fingerprints in order to exercise the right 
to access, correction or deletion seems disproportionate and thus not strictly necessary.91 
Finally, the provisions on remedies do not take into sufficient account the possibility that 
incorrect information stored in the EES may only become apparent at the border, possibly 
resulting in a refusal of entry and removal. This may have far-reaching consequences for 
third-country nationals. It may also be difficult to effectuate the right to effective judicial 
protection when the third-country national is not on Member State territory. 
 
As required by Article 47 of the CFR, the provisions on remedies should ensure 
effective judicial protection. The exercise of this right should not be made 
dependent on providing personal data and should take into account the specific 
situation of third-country nationals. 
 
3.3.1.4. Retention period 
The current proposal increases the retention period (originally envisaged as 180 
days, the period of authorised stay) to five years.92 We argue that this is 
disproportionate to the objective of determining overstay.  
 
The Commission justifies this longer retention period:  
 
 First by pointing to the similar retention period in the VIS. It is however not 
made clear which specific purpose the synchronizing of retention periods serves. 
 Second, by pointing to the need to not disproportionately inconvenience travellers 
and slow down border crossing. Although these are understandable considerations, 
convenience to travellers and efficiency should not be determining factors 
in assessing whether a considerably longer retention period is justified in relation to 
the aim of determining overstay. The proposal’s reasoning in recital 26 that 
facilitation of border crossing, for instance through self service systems “is 
dependent of the data registered in the system” does not explain the necessity of 
the five year retention period. 
 Third, by pointing to the purpose of allowing consular authorities use of the 
EES for the purpose of examining a visa applicant’s prior travel history, five years 
being the average period covered by examining entry/exit stamps.93 Here the need 
for a longer retention period is created by the proposal itself; the new 
purpose to the EES is necessary because of the abolition of the duty to stamp 
passports on entry and exit. Maintaining entry/exit stamps would allow for a 
shorter retention period while permitting consular authorities to examine a 
visa applicant’s prior travel history.  
A five-year retention period may, in the case of a registered overstay, also result 
in a de facto entry ban, as it may prove a serious obstacle in future visa applications, 
especially when the overstay is negligible. Article 31(3) provides that Member States shall 
be informed three months prior to the expiry of the retention period. The Explanatory 
Memorandum explains that at the end of the data retention period an alert based on EES 
data can be created in the Schengen Information System (SIS). This, however, means that 
the data collected for the purpose of the EES is de facto prolonged. The proposal should 
make clear that Member States, when making an entry in the SIS using data from the EES, 
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are bound by the conditions of the SIS II Regulation, incuding proportionality, and thus 
should not do so automatically at the end of the retention period. This would avoid legal 
uncertainty as was observed with regard the registration of entry-bans under the Return 
Directive and the entry of a notification in the SIS for the purpose of refusing entry.94  
3.3.1.5. Transfer of data to third countries 
A final point of concern is the transfer of data from the EES to third countries. This is 
in principle forbidden under Article 38 of the proposal, but an exception is made 
in relation to a limited set of data in the context of return proceedings. The 
proposal makes this conditional on the existence of an adequacy decision or readmission 
agreement. It should be made clear, however, that the existence of a readmission 
agreement cannot be a substitute for the existence of an adequacy decision.95  
 
 
 
3.3.2. Access to law enforcement staff for the purpose of fighting terrorism and 
international crime 
Unlike the 2013 Proposal, the current proposal envisages access to the EES from the onset 
for law enforcement in order to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist or other serious 
criminal offences. The EES may serve to identify or apprehend terrorists and criminal 
suspects (as well as identify victims) and may also serve as a criminal intelligence tool 
generating information on the travel histories of terrorists and criminal suspects (as well as 
victims). Terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences have been defined in the 
regulation with reference to the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism and the 
European Arrest Warrant, although the definitions provided in these measures have been 
criticized for a lack of specificity.96 
3.3.2.1. Appropriateness 
The ECtHR acknowledged the relevance of ‘modern scientific techniques of investigation 
and identification’ relying on certain data.97 In relation to data retained from 
telecommunications, the ECJ held, in very general terms, that these may ‘shed light on 
serious crime’ and as such could from a valuable tool for criminal investigations.98 The 
same could be argued for the data stored in the EES. 
  
However, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the EDPS and others, access to 
personal data by law enforcement can only be allowed if the data substantially 
contribute to the prevention, detection or investigation of a terrorist act or 
criminal offence.99 Unfortunately, such evidence is lacking from the Commission’s 
impact assessment on the EES. 
 
The Commission points to the VIS system, which it claims is consulted more than 14 000 
times per month. The Commission also points out that law enforcement authorities have 
access to national entry-exit systems, which the Commission claims have ‘demonstrated 
[to] fulfil a need’.100 The explanatory memorandum to the proposal refers to ‘cases of 
people who died violently and whose identification was only possible through accessing the 
VIS’ and cases of human and drug trafficking and terrorism in which access to the VIS 
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allowed investigators to make ‘substantial progress’. At no point, however, does the 
Commission present hard facts and figures that convincingly make the case for law 
enforcement access to the EES.  
 
Importantly, the identification of suspects or perpetrators of serious crime or terrorist 
offences would merely establish their identity and presence in the Schengen area (provided 
that they did not cross the border irregularly). Although the mere availability of this data, 
in particular biometric identifiers, may assist in the context of criminal law investigations, it 
must be pointed out that such a ‘just in case’ logic justifies any mass collection of personal 
data, which runs counter to the principle of data minimisation. 
3.3.2.2. Strict necessity 
Even if one were to accept that the EES could serve as a valuable tool for criminal 
investigations, it must be noted again that the EES’s data collection also covers people for 
whom there is no evidence suggesting a link with serious crime. The provisions of the EES 
must meet the test of strict necessity, which requires putting in place safeguards on the 
unlawful access and processing of data, data security, and judicial review.101 Many of the 
points made in the previous section apply here mutatis mutandis, for which reason the 
following analysis will focus on those elements that are specific to the assessment of the 
necessity of access by law enforcement staff for the purpose of criminal law enforcement. 
 
The EES proposal limits access in a number of ways. Article 29 stipulates that access can 
be necessary in a specific case when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
suspect, perpetrator or victim is covered by the scope of the EES. Access for the purpose of 
criminal identification - when the suspect, perpetrator or victim is unknown - is modelled on 
the approach taken to law enforcement access to EURODAC, that is, first requiring law 
enforcement to exhaust the use of existing databases and only then allowing for the search 
of fingerprints and facial images. Providing access to the EES for the purpose of criminal 
intelligence - in relation to known suspects, perpetrators or victims - would allow for the 
consultation of a broader data set in order to determine the travel history or periods of stay 
in the Schengen area.  
3.3.2.3. Unclear legal drafting 
The conditions and purposes of law enforcement access feature several ambiguities that 
deserve to be clarified in the readings of the proposed legislation by the European 
Parliament and the Council: 
 
 Law enforcement access is allowed ‘if necessary in a specific case’ (Article 29(b) for 
Member State authorities and 30(b) for Europol). The exact meaning of a 
‘specific case’ should be defined; 
 Access is authorised if ‘reasonable grounds exist to consider that the consultation 
of the EES data may substantially contribute to the prevention, detection or 
investigation’ of the criminal offences for which law enforcement access is envisaged 
in the EES regulation (Article 29(c) and 30(c)). The only criterion for assessing 
what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’ is that there is ‘a substantiated suspicion 
that the suspect, perpetrator or victim of a terrorist offence or other serious criminal 
offence falls under a category covered by this Regulation’ – meaning that the 
suspect, perpetrator or victim is a visa-exempt third-country national (since law 
enforcement can access the data held in VIS for Schengen visa holders). 
Furthermore, the EES regulation does not establish any criteria for assessing what a 
‘substantial contribution’ constitutes. 
                                                 
101 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, paras 57-58.  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 38 
 The notion of known and unknown suspect remains undefined in the proposal, which 
may gave rise to differing and unnecessarily broad interpretations in different 
Member States.102 
 Access to EES data is conditioned upon prior unsuccessful searches in national 
databases and, when the search concerns fingerprints, unsuccessful searches in the 
Prüm database. However, according to Article 29 of the EES regulation, such 
prior searches are not required ‘when there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that a comparison with the systems of the other Member States would not lead to 
the verification of the identity of the data subject’. This is extremely ambiguous 
since there is no definition here of what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’. 
The question here is how such reasonable grounds for not performing prior 
searches can be established in the absence of said prior searches. 
 The purpose of law enforcement access to EES is repeatedly presented as ‘criminal 
identification’. Article 29 of the EES regulation, however, also opens up the 
possibility of ‘access to the EES as a criminal intelligence tool’. Criminal 
intelligence, however, is not defined in EU legislation; for its part, the 
regulation does not include a definition. Criminal intelligence is therefore a 
broad, unsubstantiated motive for law enforcement access to EES, requiring 
either clarification or removal. 
3.3.2.4. Ex-ante review 
The ECJ in Digital Rights Ireland made clear that access by law enforcement requires prior 
review by a court or independent administrative body.103 This court or independent 
administrative body should, upon a reasoned request by the authorities, assess whether 
access is strictly necessary for the purpose of the objective pursued. The EES proposal 
requires that Member States designate one (or more) central access points to verify 
reasoned request for access by law enforcement authorities. Article 26(3) of the proposal, 
however, allows the central access point to be part of a law enforcement authority. 
Although it stresses that the central access point should act independently, this cannot 
guarantee its full independence.104 
 
3.3.2.5. Retention period 
A final concern regards the necessity of the proposed five-year retention period. No 
distinction is made in terms of the retention period as regards people who may be linked to 
terrorism or serious organised crime and those who are not. Such distinction should of 
course be made on objective factors and not profiling. Moreover, as regard to the length of 
the retention period, one can consider the opinion of AG Cruz-Villalón in Digital Rights 
Ireland: ‘without denying that there are criminal activities which are prepared well in 
advance, I have not found … any sufficient justification for not limiting the data retention 
period to be established by the Member States to less than one year’.105  
 
The justification brought forward by the Commission in its impact assessment is based on 
the average period during which law enforcement staff in the Member States have had 
most recourse to national entry-exit systems, after which a rapid decline of consultations 
could be observed.106 Again, however, the mere fact that consultations take place and the 
frequency with which they are carried out does not in itself say anything about the 
necessity of a five-year retention period. The alignment of retention periods with those of 
other databases (EURODAC, VIS) may be attractive in its simplicity but cannot itself justify 
a five-year retention period. 
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The five-year retention period must be considered as disproportionately long. At a 
minimum, a distinction should be made regarding the data of third-country 
nationals who have been linked to terrorism or serious organised crime and those 
who have not.  
 
Only to the extent that overstay could be linked, on the basis of solid evidence, to serious 
organised crime and terrorist activity should overstay be taken into account.   
  
 
3.4.  Final considerations: evidence base and interoperability 
The Commission has gone to great lengths to bring its proposal for an EES in line with the 
requirements of EU data protection law and ECJ case law. There are, however, a number of 
concerns that remain and which seem to be in contradiction with the ECJ’s ruling in Digital 
Rights Ireland.  
 
There is no solid evidence for the necessity of large-scale and indiscriminate 
storage of personal data, both in relation to the system’s objective of border and 
migration management as well as access by law enforcement. In addition, the five-
year retention period under the new proposal is unjustifiably long. There is no 
guaranteed independence of the central access point exercising an ex-ante review 
of the necessity of access by law enforcement authorities. 
 
Some further general comments are in order at this point. Even if the EES were to be found 
in full compliance with data protection legislation, the system cannot be considered in 
isolation. Rather, it forms part of an ever-expanding infrastructure of systems aimed at 
regulating borders, migration and asylum as well as fighting against terrorism and 
organised crime (SIS II, VIS, EURODAC, PNR, API). Although the 2004 Hague Programme 
stipulated that new centralised European databases should only be created on the basis of 
studies that show their added value, in the past decade there has been little restraint in the 
establishment of new databases as well as the expansion of the scope of existing ones.107 A 
thorough evaluation of the use of the databases, in particular as regards the access of law 
enforcement staff, should therefore be considered before setting up a new system. As the 
EDPS quite accurately pointed out, the key challenge is to balance a legal framework for 
data protection based on the minimisation of data collection with the belief in the benefits 
of big data.108  
 
Working in synergy with each other, these justice and home affairs databases 
may form a surveillance architecture that may not be desirable in a liberal 
democracy. It may be questioned to what extent the current legal framework for the 
protection of the right to private life and the right to personal data may be capable of 
addressing such concerns. 
 
Interoperability, which is foreseen in the proposal between the VIS and the EES, 
does not in itself constitute an interference with the rights laid down in Article 7 
and 8 of the CFR, as long as the principle of purpose limitation is respected.109 
There is, of course, a danger that this principle can be effectively sidelined when new 
purposes are added to existing legal bases.110 Moreover, as the EDPS cautioned, the 
proliferation of databases and the fact that they run on interoperable technical 
platforms may form ‘a powerful drive only for the de facto accession or exchange 
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109 One inconsistency needs to be pointed out here, namely that the new EES proposal provides for operability to 
minimise the inconvenience caused by having to collect fingerprints yet at the same time adds a facial image to 
the data collection and does not make it available in the VIS.  
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of data’.111 This is particularly true when the same authorities have access to different 
databases. At the regulatory level as well, the mere existence of the technological 
possibility may inform policy choices rather than the other way round.112 It is telling in this 
regard that the Bratislava Declaration and Road Map in the formal European Council on 16 
September 2016 expressly referred to the need for ‘interconnected’ databases at the EU’s 
external borders. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It follows from the key findings of the study that the outcome of the 2014-2015 ‘proof-of-
concept exercise’ is the first thorough documentation of the policy option favoured 
by the European Commission rather than a demonstration of the budgetary 
soundness, technical feasibility, proportionality and compliance with fundamental 
rights of the proposed measures. 
 
4.1. Assessment of the revised Smart Borders package 
Regarding the impact assessment submitted by the European Commission: 
 
 In light of the significant accumulated cost for the development, deployment and 
first seven years of operation of EES and the significant margin of error of 15-20% 
indicated in the costing of the proposed measures, the LIBE Committee should 
require the European Commission to further clarify the financial burden and 
budget risk to the EU and Member States. 
 The impact assessment of the revised legislative package does not provide a 
basis in evidence for the proportionality – in the sense of Article 5(4) of the 
TEU – of a measure that specifically aims to curb overstays of third-country 
nationals crossing the EU’s external borders for short stays. In this regard, 
the LIBE Committee should require the European Commission to design a 
complementary impact study providing unambiguous evidence that the 
Smart Borders package does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objective of curbing overstaying. 
 The impact assessment of the revised legislative package does not provide an 
evidence-based demonstration that law enforcement access to EES is 
proportionate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the TEU. The LIBE Committee 
should require the European Commission, together with eu-LISA, to provide up-to-
date and detailed information regarding searches for law-enforcement 
purposes involving fingerprints in the VIS. The study finds that at this time the 
reporting of eu-LISA on the use of VIS for law enforcement purposes, which 
is used as the basis for assessing the projected use of EES, remains inconclusive, 
in particular for searches involving fingerprints. New evidence should be 
properly taken into account when considering law enforcement access to EES. 
 The additional clarifications and further evidence should be examined in a 
study undertaken by independent experts before the Smart Borders legislative 
package is taken into consideration by the co-legislators. 
 
4.2. Biometrics 
 
Regarding the use of biometrics (facial images and biometrics) in the proposed measures: 
 
 Although the revised legislative package constitutes an effort to minimise the 
biometric data collected and stored in the proposed EES, proportionality issues 
remain. The LIBE Committee should consider the following options to achieve 
further data minimisation.    
 The objective of replacing the physical stamping obligation can be achieved 
without collecting, storing or accessing fingerprints. It is sufficient to 
compare a live facial image with the facial image stored on the chip of an 
electronic passport to verify the identity of travellers. This process does not 
require storage of facial image biometrics, thus increasing data minimisation. Visual 
verification by a border guard is sufficient in cases where travellers do not 
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carry an e-passport. For the purpose of replacing the physical stamping obligation, 
the storing of data on the identity of travellers, travel document and visa 
information, as well as travel history for a period of 181 days is sufficient. 
 Should the use of fingerprints, be considered relevant by the co-legislators, their 
introduction should be planned from the start to avoid issues encountered in the 
development of other JHA information systems. The LIBE Committee should 
however consider a tiered rollout process. To fully test the reliability of the 
system before particularly sensitive data is collected and stored, the introduction of 
fingerprints collection and storage in particular should be made conditional upon 
an assessment of the functionality of EES without fingerprints after at least 
two years of operation. This tiered rollout and assessment should also concern 
interoperability with VIS. The proposal for a regulation establishing the EES should 
accordingly be amended to include: 1) a two-year moratorium on the 
introduction of the collection and storage of, and access to fingerprints; 2) a 
suspension clause should the functioning of EES without the collecting and 
storing of as well as access to fingerprints be found less than optimal; 3) a 
sunset clause foreseeing the shutdown of EES functionalities for 
fingerprints collection and storage should data protection issues arise. 
  
4.3. Automation of border checks 
 
Regarding the possibility of introducing further automated processes at EU external border 
crossings: 
 The adoption of a harmonised legal basis for the use of automated 
processes for border crossings is proportionate given the growing use by 
border control authorities of Member States of such processes, particularly ABC 
gates and e-kiosks. A harmonised legal basis would provide legal certainty and 
support facilitation measures to address the growing workload of border 
guards at the EU’s external borders. 
 As such, the proposal for a regulation to amend the Schengen Borders Code for this 
purpose should be considered independently from the proposal for a regulation to 
establish EES. The LIBE Committee should consider the possibility of 
amending the proposal for a regulation to amend the Schengen Borders 
Code so that the provision of a harmonised legal basis for automation does 
not depend on the establishment of EES. 
 
4.4. Law enforcement access 
 
Regarding law enforcement access to EES: 
 At this time there is no basis in evidence for providing law enforcement 
access to EES, whether by Member State authorities or Europol. Such a 
measure would not meet the criteria for either necessity or proportionality, either in 
the sense of Article 5(4) of the TEU or interference with fundamental rights. 
Therefore, the LIBE Committee should consider not endorsing law 
enforcement access to EES. 
 Before law enforcement access is considered, a thorough inquiry into the effective 
use of existing systems, especially VIS, should be conducted. At this time, the 
reporting of eu-LISA on the use of VIS for law enforcement purposes remains 
inconclusive. Since VIS has only recently completed its full rollout, a five-year 
monitoring and assessment period by eu-LISA to start in 2016 or 2017 
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should be considered a minimum to inform a decision on law enforcement 
access to EES. This would give time for law enforcement authorities in the Member 
States to familiarise themselves with VIS and provide information about its utility. 
 Should law enforcement access to EES eventually be found relevant by the co-
legislators, provisions similar to the collection and storage of biometrics should 
apply, namely: 1) a two-year moratorium on law enforcement access to EES in 
order to ensure that the system is functioning as planned; 2) a suspension clause 
should the functioning of EES without law enforcement access be found less than 
optimal; 3) a sunset clause foreseeing the shutdown of law enforcement 
access to EES should it be found irrelevant (low number of searches) 
and/or should issues with the purpose of access or use of access arise. 
 
4.5. Fundamental rights compliance 
 
In addition to the recommendations made in relation to the use of biometrics under the 
proportionality assessment under Article 5(4) of the TEU, the following recommendations 
can be made in relation to the fundamental compliance of the Smart Borders proposal with 
fundamental rights:  
 As it stands, the EES proposal forms a particularly serious interference with the 
right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data. 
This interference should be considered disproportionate. 
 The indiscriminate retention period of five years cannot be justified either in view of 
the objective of identifying overstay or for the purpose of criminal law enforcement. 
The originally envisaged retention period of 181 days should be considered 
again. In addition, the possibility of distinct retention periods for distinct 
categories of persons should be contemplated.  
 The proposal should provide an effective judicial remedy for all data subjects in 
line with Article 47 CFR. This remedy should not merely cover access, correction and 
deletion; it also should not be made dependent on the provision of additional 
personal data.  
 The transfer of data from the EES to third countries in the context of return should 
only be possible under the strict conditions prescribed in the proposal and 
exclusively when there is an adequacy decision in the third country 
concerned as regards the protection of personal data.  
 The rationale for the collection and access to EES by criminal law enforcement are 
not supported by objective and sound evidence. It is the task of the EU 
legislator to provide such evidence. 
 The proposal should guarantee the independence of ex-ante control of access 
to law enforcement. 
 The provisions regulating access to the EES by law enforcement need to be drafted 
with much more precision so as to provide for both legal certainty and diverging 
approaches across the Member States. In particular: 1) in Articles 29(b) and 30(b), 
the meaning of ‘specific case’ should be clarified; 2) in Articles 29(b) and 29(c), 
the definition of ‘reasonable grounds’ should be further specified, as well as the 
exact meaning of ‘substantially contribute’; 3) in Article 29, the meaning of 
‘reasonable grounds’ on which access to EES can be authorised without 
prior searches in national databases and in the Prüm system should be 
clarified; 4) in Article 29, the notion of criminal intelligence should either be 
defined or removed, as it is not defined elsewhere in the EES regulation or in EU 
legislation and therefore constitutes too broad a criteria for authorising law 
enforcement access. 
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